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Crossing the Grebbe Line
Canada’s Faustian Bargain to Save Civilians in
the Western Netherlands, April-May 1945
NAT HA N DYC K
Abstract : Beginning at the military-political level and ending at
the regimental level, this paper will explore the growth of Canadian
responsibility within a failing Allied relief framework throughout
the Dutch Hunger Winter 1944-1945. Beginning in early April 1945,
I Canadian Corps experienced a growing responsibility to secure an
independently negotiated and effective ceasefire on the Grebbe Line to
enable transport of food prior to broader German surrender. Under the
name of Operation Faust, I Corps utilised targeted medical and food
relief practices to address gaps in Allied relief capacity, following what
Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) referred to as a “hastily
improvised” planning process. The objective of this article is to explore
how an unheralded Canada exerted such great humanitarian influence
while acting independently of the broader Allied command framework.

A

came to its final phase in NorthWest Europe, Canada became critically involved in brokering a
deal with the devil. In April 1945, the Allies participated in extensive
negotiations with the Germans occupying the North-Western
Netherlands to administer food relief to a starved population, with
the Canadian-led portion of the relief effort being appropriately
named Operation Faust. This undertaking was initiated by the
Austrian-born Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who in 1940
had been appointed by Adolf Hitler to administer the occupied
Netherlands. When in the spring of 1945 the Canadians severed the
starved region and surrounded the Reichskommissar, Seyss-Inquart
s the second wor ld war
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acted independently from Hitler, in part to seek mercy from Allied
punishment for his brutalising of the Dutch population.
Liberation is an important facet of the shared Dutch-Canadian
memory of the war. It is odd, then, that the nuanced details of
Canada’s role in managing this humanitarian crisis and military
standoff have been overshadowed by popularised and dramatized
stories of the arguably inefficient Operation Manna-Chowhound—
the British and American effort to supply the starving Dutch with
air drops—as well as the broader surrender negotiations occurring
adjacent to Operation Faust. This article’s findings dovetails with
the conclusions reached by Ingrid de Zwarte’s excellent study The
Hunger Winter: Fighting Famine in the Occupied Netherlands,
which makes the important argument that high-level relief planning
and military strategy were constantly in conflict with one another
after Operation Market Garden. De Zwarte concludes that the most
significant Allied contribution to relief was the informal ceasefire and
subsequent transport for food negotiated with Seyss-Inquart.1 Aside
from the work of C. P. Stacey’s Canadian Army official history—or
the more recent analysis of Mark Zeuhlke and David Borys—surveys
of Canadian operations in North-West Europe often bypass analysis
of the Canadians’ relief efficacy and logistics.2 A more self-contained
analysis of Operation Faust is a productive addition to the Canadian
historiography due to the operation’s unique context and measurable
humanitarian outcomes.

Given the vast scope of de Zwarte’s study, little time is spent framing Operation
Faust as either a uniquely important or distinctly Canadian operation. Ingrid de
Zwarte, The Hunger Winter: Fighting Famine in the Occupied Netherlands, 19441945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 128, 150-152, and 259.
2  
While benefiting from the detail afforded by an official history, Stacey does not
account for the comparative humanitarian value of Faust or explore the mutual
dependence shared between the Faust ceasefire and broader surrender negotiations.
Similar to de Zwarte, the broader scope of both Zuehlke and Borys’ work both
warrant a prioritization of narrative flow over building an analytical framework that
explores Faust’s efficacy, particularly regarding its relatively equitable distributive
method. See C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second
World War – Volume III: The Victory Campaign (Ottawa: Department of National
Defence Historical Section, 1960), 609; Mark Zuehlke, On to Victory: The Canadian
Liberation of the Netherlands, March 23-May 5, 1945 (Toronto: Douglas and
McIntyre, 2010), 419-421; and David A. Borys, Civilians at the Sharp End: First
Canadian Army Civil Affairs in Northwest Europe, (Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2021), 173-180.
1  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol31/iss2/5

2

Dyck: Crossing the Grebbe Line
DYCK

3

Closer examination of regimental reporting and post-war reflection
reveals a fragile dynamic wherein the development of surrender
negotiations was more causally linked to Canadian relief efforts than
is revealed within the broader historiography. Building on the fact
that the western Netherlands was merely days away from complete
humanitarian disaster, Operation Faust was both more secure and
equitable in its distribution than Operation Manna-Chowhound, while
still keeping pace in the realm of quantitative success measured by
tonnage delivered. The price paid was Faust being an inherently riskier
operation due to the stability of its ceasefire being closely intertwined
with the likelihood of a seamless German surrender. If Canadian
operations behind enemy lines remained stable, many Dutch could be
saved and German demilitarisation could be expedited. Alternatively,
any security issues faced during the operation could have complicated
broader German demilitarizaiton and further delayed food relief.

strategic and political backdrop
The strategic crux of both the German invasion of the Netherlands
in 1940 and the Canadian standoff with Germany in 1945 was the
Grebbeberg, an elevated tract of land east of Rhenen. It was the
cornerstone of the Grebbe defensive line, which ran north to south
from the Ijsselmeer to the Rhine utilising a combination of trenches
and inundations to protect the urban western Netherlands. Since
the creation of these defences in 1874 the Dutch referred to the
primarily urban region west of the Grebbe Line and north of the
Waal River as “Fortress Holland.”3 Between 11 and 13 May 1940 the
German invasion broke through the Grebbeberg—behind which a
significant portion of the Dutch field army was defeated—forcing a
Dutch surrender on 15 May.4
The Dutch cabinet and royal family fled to London and
functioned as a government-in-exile, leaving behind ministerial
undersecretaries and senior civil servants. Reichskommissar Seyss-

3  
C.M. Shulten and P.M.J. de Koster, “Between Hope and Fear: The Netherlands
Armed Forces in the Interwar Period,” in Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis
eds. May 1940: The Battle for the Netherlands (Boston: Brill, 2010), 38 and 63.
4  
H.W. van den Doel, “The Field Army Defeated: The Battle for the Grebbe Line,”
in Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis ed. The Battle for the Netherlands, 261.
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Inquart was tasked with maintaining control of a functional Dutch
economy while cultivating a common Germanic identity through
the influence of the Dutch Nazi Party, which tripled in membership
during the occupation.5 However, by 1943, outright exploitation of
Dutch industrial capacity began to correlate with the growth of
Dutch resistance.6 This volatile dynamic continued to snowball until
Operation Market Garden—the September 1944 Allied air assault
aimed at securing a key crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem—called
for consolidation of Dutch resistance into the Forces of the Interior
(Nederlandse Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten—NBS) and parallel
civilian rail strikes aimed at disrupting the German supply lines.7
After Market Garden failed, a combination of war-related disruption
of imports, destruction of critical infrastructure, geographic divisions
and continued growth of clandestine markets drastically limited food
access for the remaining occupied Dutch, including major urban
population centres such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague.8
By late November 1944, the Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group
Civil Affairs concluded that the food situation in the western
Netherlands was the “overriding problem of the entire campaign.”9
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill neglected the issue as there
was no certainty whether a breakthrough on the Rhine would occur
quickly.10 Dutch Prime Minister P. S. Gerbrandy’s position remained
consistent throughout relief negotiations beginning in autumn 1944
between the Dutch and the Allies: “The Netherlands Government
cannot accept the liberation of corpses.”11 With the Dutch Directorate
of Food Supply under the heel of German coercion, community-based
Gerhard Hirschfeld, Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under
German Occupation 1940-1945 (Oxford: Berg, 1988), 27-28, 284.
6  
Hein A. M. Klemann, “Did the German Occupation (1940-1945) Ruin Dutch
Industry?,” Contemporary European History, 17, 4 (2008): 476.
7  
Walter B. Maass, The Netherlands at War 1940-1945 (London: Abelard-Schuman,
1970), 186-87.
8  
De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 59
9  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 172: Canadian Participation in Civil
Affairs/Military Government. Part IV: Belgium and the Netherlands,” 11 March
1947, 20, Directorate of History and Heritage [Hereafter DHH]
10  
Bob Moore, “The Western Allies and Food Relief to the Occupied Netherlands,
1944–1945,” War & Society, 10 (1992): 96-97 and 110.
11  
“Copy of Ltr, P. S. Gerbrandy, Netherlands Prime Minister, to Eisenhower,” 16
December 1944, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Report: Relief to Holland, in Harry L
Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington
D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1992).
5  
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relief organisations increasingly turned to churches and resistance
groups to fill the role of a crumbling bureaucracy. Further, some
British directives impeded potential internal solutions to the food
crisis. On 19 October, Radio Oranje, a BBC broadcast directed at
the occupied Netherlands, urged against working with the occupier
to help with the potato harvest that had stalled due to labour strikes
following Market Garden. Expressing skepticism of this hardline
approach in the illegal newspaper Trouw, Dutch resistance groups
felt that avoiding starvation was the immediate goal. Nonetheless,
heeding their government’s call, only 2,240 volunteers came forward
of the 20,000 needed for the harvesting campaign.12 In January 1945,
Seyss-Inquart issued a radio broadcast stating that “nobody could
or should contend that the present rations were even approximately
sufficient” and proceeded to wish the people of the Netherlands good
luck with the coming year.13
Unfortunately, prior to April 1945, the Germans in Western
Europe had followed a strict doctrine of non-surrender and the
Allies never considered the possibility of negotiating directly with
the Germans to alleviate the suffering of the Dutch as civil affairs
matters became increasingly complicated.14 But as early as December
1944, Seyss-Inquart had expressed a willingness to act independently
from Berlin and isolate the western Netherlands. Unfortunately,
this opportunity was lost amidst the administrative shuffle of
communications between the Council of Trusted Representatives—a
clandestine group of Dutch Government-in-Exile representatives
working in the occupied Netherlands—and London. In retrospect, the
Council admitted passing this opportunity by had been a grievous
error as it might have avoided much of the Hunger Winter 1944-45.15
A May 1944 Civil Affairs Agreement between the US, Britain
and the Dutch created Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force (SHAEF) Netherlands Mission, which was responsible for
relief planning, while the Netherlands Military Administration
(NMA)—a liaison between the Dutch resistance and London—would

De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 94-96, 209.
“Copy of Ltr, Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina to President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill,” 15 January 45, an. 43, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpt, Relief to
Holland, in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs.
14  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 172,” 29, DHH.
15  
De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 102-03, 145.
12  
13  
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implement relief efforts.16 Sir Jack Drummond, head nutritionist at
the British Ministry of Food, presented a resistance-sourced report
to the War Cabinet in January 1945 warning that regardless of
its willingness to do so Germany lacked capacity to address the
famine. Drummond warned that the estimated daily calorie intake
of 500-800 was only sustainable for “two or three months” before
death rates would rise rapidly.17
By March, Churchill’s reluctance to pursue relief efforts began to
wane. While ration supply issues delayed concrete action until late
April, Gerbrandy’s sustained pleas for aid combined with evidence
of widespread malnutrition from British assessments started to tip
the scales. Rather than being purely informed by humanitarian good
will, it is a conceivable conclusion that the Allies simply wanted to
proactively address a potentially massive strain on organizational
capacity if Allied troops had to immediately treat an catastrophe
upon gaining access to the occupied area.18 The Allies were well
furnished with Dutch resistance intelligence on the state of the civilian
population inside the occupied territory, which by April described a
particularly dire situation.19 Amsterdam and Rotterdam, normally
reliant on surplus food from the agrarian eastern provinces, were cut
off from supply.20 Available rations had plummeted to 525 calories a
day.21 The previous year, in July 1944, the average daily ration for
adults had been 1,350 calories and roughly 1,800 calories prior to
1944.22 SHAEF reported that coal supplies in the region were nearly
depleted, effectively disabling most household heating. Death rates
stemming from tuberculosis, diphtheria and enteritis tripled.23

De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 128.
“The Food Situation in Belgium and the Netherlands,” 30 January 1945, CAB
66/61/28, The National Archives [hereafter TNA].
18  
Moore, “The Western Allies and Food Relief to the Occupied Netherlands,” 111.
19  
Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation, 213.
20  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 152: The Concluding Phase: The Advance
into North-West Germany and the Final Liberation of the Netherlands 23 Mar-5
May 45,” 21 March 1946,” 22, DHH.
21  
Zena Stein’s study on the famine’s effect on human development in the Netherlands
estimates that roughly 670 calories were available by March. Van Der Zee suggests
525. See van der Zee, The Hunger Winter, 181; and Zena Stein, Famine and Human
Development: The Dutch Hunger Winter 1944-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1975), 49.
22  
Stein, Famine and Human Development, 43.
23  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 152”, 23, DHH.
16  
17  
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Strategic matters remained regardless of the political will to
assist the starving Dutch. SHAEF head General (Gen.) Dwight D.
Eisenhower felt that tackling an estimated German strength of over
200,000—beginning with the fortified Grebbe Line—was seen as more
difficult than simply isolating the western Netherlands from Berlin
and leveraging this position of strength to address the food problem.24
Still, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group had
already ordered that, upon crossing the Rhine River and securing
the area immediately northward in preparation for an assault on
Apeldoorn, First Canadian Army (FCA), under the command Gen.
H. D. G. Crerar, would at once begin an assault on the western
Netherlands.25 Beginning April 12, FCA’s I Corps advanced from
the south through Arnhem, supported by an advance from the east
by II Corps through Zutphen and Deventer.26 While the liberation
of Arnhem was underway, I Corps commander Lieutenant-General
Charles Foulkes issued ambitious instructions to capture the western
Netherlands. Three divisions would assault the German defences,
the strength of which Foulkes considered to be “still a matter of
considerable speculation.”27 I Corps adopted the codeword “Faust” for
its potential clearing and administering of the western Netherlands,
a name that would be quickly repurposed to refer to relief operations
by negotiated ceasefire through the Grebbe Line.28
While these plans were being distributed, Montgomery, altering
his priorities to match SHAEF directives, cancelled the assault and
ordered all available resources to be shifted east. Operations south of
the Zuider Zee were restricted to two divisions, virtually scrapping
any possibility of a successful assault on the western Netherlands.29
I Corps—containing formations situated directly at the bottleneck
of German defenses on the Arnhem-Rhenen road—contended that
the Germans’ “eventual object [was] to transform Utrecht, the Hague
“Analysis Sheet, SCAF-250, SMC-IN 9439,” 27 March 1945, SHAEF files, G-5,
Hist Report, 60, Relief to Holland, in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs.
25  
Douglas E. Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at
War 1939-1945 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 289.
26  
Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in North-West 1944-1945 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2006), 263.
27  
Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 571-72.
28  
“G 1 Cdn Corps to 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 Cdn Armd Div, 49 (WR) Inf Div, 1 Cdn
Armd Bde, CRE 1 Cdn C Tps, 1 Cdn Corps Sigs,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Vol. 10761, File
222C1. (D43), Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC]
29  
Delaney, Corps Commanders, 289.
24  
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and Rotterdam into island fortresses” by way of inundation, with the
3,000-strong 34th SS Nederlands Division “acting as the pivot for
the retreat by manning the line of the Neder Rijn from Arnhem to
Tiel.”30 For the rest of the war, Colonel-General Johannes Blaskowitz’s
Twenty-Fifth Army held the western Netherlands.
I Corps then began to transition from a military to a humanitarian
role. Roughly 40 per cent of the overall Dutch population of nine million
were still under German occupation in the western Netherlands.31
With changing priorities and the Canadians’ dominant presence
on the Grebbe Line, on 13 April Netherlands District—a special
headquarters established by SHAEF in January 1945 to plan for
relief in the eastern Netherlands—came under control of FCA. The
boundaries of Netherlands District were not to be altered except by
FCA, which was to be exempt from providing relief by boat and air
in order to focus on relief by road from the east.32 FCA Civil Affairs
liaised with Netherlands District during development of a distribution
model, adding yet another facet to the expanding role of FCA Civil
Affairs units in broader relief efforts, who since October 1944 had
increasingly been directed by SHAEF to prop up NMA’s troubled
execution of its civil administration mandate in liberated areas.33
In October 1944, SHAEF relief plans estimated that a daily
ration distribution of 2,026 tons would be required to get just one
pound of food a day to each civilian inside the western Netherlands.34
Impeding a comprehensive distribution plan was the quick expansion
of the Dutch black market during the Hunger Winter, a market
which explicitly favoured the wealthy or well-connected few who
could afford foodstuffs at significantly higher prices.35 During the
occupation 40 per cent of agricultural production was sold on illegal
markets.36 Relief efforts would have to ensure equal distribution to
circumvent the clandestine distribution networks.
“Addendum to 56 Inf Bde Op Instr No 36,” 16 April 1945, WO 171/4344,
XC/6/204, TNA.
31  
Moore, “The Western Allies,” 102.
32  
“The Netherlands: responsibilities for command and control within First Canadian
Army,” 22 April 1945, RG24, Operation Faust, Vol. 10825, 1, LAC.
33  
Borys, Civilians at the Sharp End, 150 and 175.
34  
Zuehlke, On to Victory, 193.
35  
van der Zee, The Hunger Winter, 154-55.
36  
Tom Vorstenbosch, Ingrid de Zwarte, Leni Duistermaat, and Tinde van Andel,
“Famine food of vegetal origin consumed in the Netherlands during World War II,”
Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine, 13, 63 (2017): 2.
30  
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planning and negotiations
In the words of Gen. Crerar, the western Netherlands had “chosen
to fight a separate battle,” fully cut off from support and effectively
rejecting any orders from Berlin.37 On 1 April, Seyss-Inquart met
with German Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert
Speer in Oldenburg to discuss their shared opposition to Hitler’s
destructive Nero Decree, during which Speer informed him that
the war was effectively lost.38 The German war economy was to
collapse in four to eight weeks due to vast loss of territory, a ruined
transportation network and extensive bombing of key industries.39
Seyss-Inquart then “prepared for the worst” as “consequences were
unpredictable.”40 While the Canadian advance was beginning on 2
April, over the next ten days Seyss-Inquart sought relief discussions
with NBS in Amsterdam, which informed the Allies of the results.
If the Canadians halted at the Grebbe Line, the Reichskommissar
would negotiate surrender and food relief.41
An FCA report reflected on the new strategic balance. During
the negotiations with NBS, it was reported by SHAEF that SeyssInquart threatened that he had been “ordered to hold out under
all circumstances, and to carry out the necessary demolitions and
inundations for that purpose - in order to hold out against what [the
Germans] thought were superior allied forces.”42 It had taken more
than three centuries of land reclamation to develop the countryside
west of Utrecht and the region appeared to be in serious danger if
operations continued or if the upcoming negotiations failed.43 The
report noted that while both parties agreed that there would be
no food left within three weeks, the Germans did not see this as
an excuse to surrender. Seyss-Inquart also asked for the halting of

CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 152,” 10, DHH.
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings: Volumes 15-16, 11 June 1946, 15-16, Avalon project,
Yale University.
39  
Martin Kitchen, Speer: Hitler’s Architect (New Haven: Yale University Press:
2015), 262-278.
40  
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, 11 June 1946, 15-16.
41  
Maass, The Netherlands at War, 236.
42  
Paraphrased by First Canadian Army, see “Negotiations between Dutch Forces of
the Interior and Seyss-Inquart in Amsterdam,” 16 April 1945, RG24, Negotiations,
Vol. 10658, 1, LAC.
43  
Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 581.
37  
38  
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sabotage directed at German troops in return for ceasing violence
against the Dutch.44
An FCA meeting on 26 April explored the feasibility of various
food relief methods in preparation for meetings with the Germans.
The potential for dropping food by air had greatly increased but
concern arose regarding the efficiency of its distribution, which
followed similar warnings from the Dutch Government in Exile
occurring as early as January 1945.45 Transport by barges was also
considered, but this option would require three weeks of repairs to the
canals to work effectively. It was determined that the most effective
and quickest means of food relief was by road as this method could
transport 2,000 tons of food daily through the Grebbe Line.46
These rations came from a more general stockpile ordered by
SHAEF in December 1944, to be sourced “the maximum extent
possible from UK sources.”47 By the end of April, seventy-four days’
worth of rations for 3.6 million people to consume 1,600-1,700 calories
daily had been gathered. Some 50,000 of the 130,000 available tons
were already being stored in the Netherlands; the rest remained in
British dockside warehouses.48 By 27 April, the tactical situation
north of the Rhine had stabilised enough for thirty vehicles from
the British 49th Infantry Division to begin transporting rations
from Nijmegen to a forward stockpile at Ede. This ten-day process
seamlessly overlapped with the beginnings of Operation Faust.49
The first round of negotiations with the Germans took place
in a schoolhouse in Achterveld, a small town five miles outside of
Amersfoort on the Canadian side of the Grebbe Line. Never before
had the Allies met with high-ranking German military officials in
this sort of setting. This meeting, along with the legendary followup negotiations on 30 April, are given ample attention in existing
literature, most recently from a Dutch perspective in de Zwarte’s

“Negotiations between Dutch Forces of the Interior and Seyss-Inquart in
Amsterdam,” 2.
45  
Zuehlke, On to Victory, 195.
46  
“Meeting in Chief of Staff’s Caravan 1800hrs 1st Cdn Army,” 26 April 1945,
RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, 1-2, LAC.
47  
“Msg, SHAEF to WD, 15 Dec 44, MEL371, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43),” in Coles
and Weinberg, Civil Affairs.
48  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 172,” 20-21, DHH.
49  
War Diary, HQ RASC 49 (WR) Infantry Division, April and May 1945, WO
171/4230, TNA.
44  
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The Hunger Winter.50 Yet Canadian-led planning and negotiations
for the ceasefire to enable Operation Faust, which occurred in the
background of these well-known exchanges, reveals another fragile
dynamic at play.
SHAEF’s postponement of direct relief action had allowed
the matter to became directly intertwined with broader surrender
negotiations. Complications associated with Operation Faust now
had the potential to damage the achievement of an end to the war
in the Netherlands, and I Corps was still reporting an unpredictable
and dangerous tactical environment near the eventual route taken by
Operation Faust through the Grebbe Line at Rhenen. On 23 April,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) established
a Tactical HQ just outside Achterveld, repelling a “strong fighting
patrol” there the following day.51 The British 49th Infantry Division
circulated an intelligence report indicating that the bulk of the German
361st Infantry Division was occupying a position at a continuation of
the Grebbe Line south of the Neder Rijn that was not supported by
inundation. On the night of 28 April, a German patrol was sent from
the Grebbe Line in the direction of Ede to gather intelligence and
possibly collect a prisoner. But the patrol overextended not having
realised that it already had passed a 49th Infantry Division outpost,
resulting in an exchange of fire and the death of one German officer.
Intelligence obtained from a German prisoner indicated similar
patrols would continue despite the unofficial truce that was being
developed by Canadian planners.52
There was also concern regarding “the enormous number of
miscellaneous units under [such as the unpredictable 34th SS Dutch
Volunteer Division] command which swell the divisional tail, and
which supply those reinforcements which so often seem to appear from
nowhere.”53 While an official order from the German high command
to cease operations would occur ahead of relief negotiations, Dutch
Prince Bernhard was justifiably concerned about the possibility of
“desperados” within these panicked and disorganised units continuing
See De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 150-152.
War Diary: Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 23 April 1945, Vroemen
358, File 4/119, Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH).
52  
“49 Infantry Division Intelligence Report: Patrol Group,” 30 April 1945, Vroemen
418, NIMH.
53  
“49 (WR) Inf Div Intelligence Summary NO 135,” 23 April 1945, Vroemen 426,
File 6/17, NIMH.
50  
51  
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destruction regardless of orders. As incidents of Wehrmacht flooding
and SS executions of members of the Dutch resistance remained
frequent at this time, Faust could be a very dangerous venture. The
Allies needed to provide appropriate security measures.54
While the western Netherlands would come under the general
control of 21st Army Group when a successful relief agreement was
struck with the Germans, I Corps would remain responsible for the
planning and execution of Operation Faust.55 In order to strike a
careful balance between expediency and security a Joint Planning
Staff was set up with SHAEF Netherlands District—which was then
under the direction of FCA—at Rear HQ, I Corps, where daily liaison
meetings were held.56 Rear HQ described the “general policy” arising
from such meetings to be “helping the [Dutch] help themselves.”57
Foulkes facilitated all meetings with German authorities on
behalf of the Allies and, on 30 April, led Faust negotiations. 58
While perhaps ill-suited to the role of a corps commander, Foulkes
had a bureaucratic disposition and was adept at manipulating
the strengths and weaknesses of an individual to meet his own
objectives. 59 Supervising this process was the Chief of Staff to
Montgomery, Major-General Francis de Guingand. His orders were
to obtain an “agreement for the immediate entry of food, and also
to sound the enemy as to the possibilities of the capitulation of
the German forces in Holland,” but Foulkes was to be responsible
for relief specifically through the Grebbe Line as commander of I
Corps.60 This was to be done alongside de Guingand’s American
counterpart Gen. Walter Bedell-Smith, who had sparred with
Gerbrandy in December over whether the disorder of the NMA

De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 147.
“Notes of a meeting to examine administrative aspects in connection with the
feeding of the Dutch,” 26 April 1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix
A, LAC.
56  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 172,” 20, DHH.
57  
War Diary: Mil Gov Branch - Rear HQ 1 Cdn Corps, 27 April 1945, RG24-C-3,
Vol. 16633, File BR/16 MIL GOV, LAC.
58  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56: The German Surrender, May 1945” 18
November 1952, 16, DHH.
59  
Delaney, Corps Commanders, 295.
60  
Francis de Guingand, “Operation Victory,” January 1947, Vroemen 447, File 95,
NIMH.
54  

55  
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or lack of available transportation had led to weak distributive
capacity throughout existing relief efforts.61
Air drops of food ignored such vulnerabilities, though for the
British it remained a favoured relief method. Between 25 and 28
April the weather was too poor for a safe and effective launch of
Operation Manna-Chowhound.62 During this time, I Corps received
another indication that Dutch authorities held a contrary opinion
to the British and American preference for air drops, expressing
concern that Operation Manna-Chowhound did not provide enough
distributive security and “only the black market and a small clique
will reap the benefit of it.”63 The occupation had led Dutch urbanites
to become reliant on agriculturalists who often took to gouging prices
via clandestine markets. The share of national available income held
by the agrarian population jumped from 16 per cent in 1938 to 61
per cent in 1944.64 Unless the air drops were somehow voluminous
enough to fully eliminate demand for food in the western Netherlands,
Operation Manna-Chowhound alone would leave a void of both
distributive capacity and the ability to overcome an inequitable
clandestine market during the transition back to pre-war governance.
The morning before preliminary relief negotiations with German
representatives on 28 April, de Guingand met with Foulkes to run
through the procedures that Foulkes had prepared. As de Guingand
recalled, the room held an “atmosphere of subdued excitement, for it
was obvious to everyone that something of a great moment was taking
place.”65 The day before, 21st Army Group had ordered a ceasefire for
Allied troops situated on the Grebbe Line. I Corps was still concerned
that this could not be sufficiently communicated to enemy forces,
reporting that “the only direct means of communications would be by
wireless, in clear, and it would not do to create the ‘flap’ which this
would cause all over the world.”66
“Copy of Ltr, P. S. Gerbrandy, Netherlands Prime Minister, to Gen Walter Bedell
Smith,” 16 December 1944, an. 18, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rpt, 60, Relief to Holland,
in Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs.
62  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” cover page, 15, DHH.
63  
“Wireless message intercepted by I Cdn Corps regarding food supply for civilian
population of the Netherlands,” 25 April 1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, LAC.
64  
Hein A. M. Klemann and Sergei. Kudryashov, Occupied Economies: an Economic
History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Berg, 2012), 385.
65  
De Guingand, “Operation Victory,” January 1947, Vroemen 447, File 95, 1, NIMH
66  
“Memo summarizing arrangements for meeting with representatives of the
German authorities in Holland,” 27 April 1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, 2.
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Around midday on 28 April, I Corps representatives met the
German delegation at Amersfoort and, after taking some time to
convince them of the necessity of blindfolds, transported them to the
schoolhouse in Achterveld. Conduct with the enemy adhered strictly
to the Manual of Military Law.67 I Corps was to provide lunch for
the meeting, but it was instructed that “under no circumstances
will the enemy delegates be given luncheon in company with the
Allied reps.”68 The Reichskommissar and Colonel-General Blaskowitz
were represented by Ernst Schwebel, deputy to Seyss-Inquart, and
some military staff. As the Germans entered the room, de Guingand
sternly rejected any pleasantries. Across a long table sat the German
delegation led by Schwebel, whom de Guingand described as a
“revolting, plump and sweating man.” On the Allied side was de
Guingand, members of the NMA and selected planners for each
relief method, including Foulkes, a naval officer from SHAEF and an
officer from 2nd Tactical Air Force.69 The meeting’s purpose was to
explain the potential methods by which rations could safely enter the
western Netherlands, after which the German delegates would inform
their superiors so that the meeting on 30 April could run smoothly.70
With such matters attended to, de Guingand tried his hand at
suggesting a broader cessation of hostilities. Due to Blaskowitz’s
steadfast deference to Berlin, a proper cessation of combat was a tricky
matter to bring up around German military personnel: “Schwebel,
looking rather uncomfortable and glancing repeatedly at the soldier
next to him, said he was not empowered to discuss such matters. He
agreed, however, to convey my remarks to [Seyss-Inquart].”71
The Germans requested that the meetings remain confidential,
while Foulkes insisted that the ceasefire on the Grebbe Line
originating on 28 April be extended until the next meeting. 21st
Army Group, eager to sustain the chances of a broader ceasefire
during relief negotiations, left direction of this matter to Foulkes, who

“Memo summarizing arrangements for meeting with representatives of the
German authorities,” 2.
68  
“Meeting in Chief of Staff’s Caravan 1800hrs 1st Cdn Army,” 26 April 1945,
RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, 3, LAC.
69  
De Guingand, “Operation Victory,” January 1947, Vroemen 447, File 95, 2, NIMH
70  
“Memo summarizing arrangements for meeting with representatives of the German
authorities,” Appendix B. See also De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 150.
71  
De Guingand, “Operation Victory,” January 1947, Vroemen 447, File 95, 2-3, NIMH.
67  
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declared a “no firing” order would remain in effect.72 Accordingly,
Foulkes met for an hour with a German official on the morning of 29
April at the same rendezvous spot outside of Achterveld in order to
ensure compliance with the ceasefire.73
29 April also saw favorable enough weather for Operation
Manna-Chowhound to begin. There were four primary drop zones,
two located at the Hague and two at Rotterdam. On the first day
510 tons were dropped, increasing to 1,074 the following day.74 While
initially skeptical of the operation, the Germans began moving
troops and artillery away from the drop zones after the first few
flights. While Manna-Chowhound was certainly an iconic moment
for the Netherlands given its powerful imagery, it fell quite short of
ration requirements. A total of 7.8 million kilograms of food dropped
meant an average of only 3 kilograms per person inside the western
Netherlands.75 Further, this estimate does not account for lack of
equitable distribution, a virtually unachievable outcome given the
weakened organisational capacity of the Dutch resistance, a stubborn
German military presence, the lack of medical staff and the prevalence
of the black market.
On the morning of 30 April, the day of Hitler’s suicide in Berlin,
Foulkes escorted the enemy delegates from the regular rendezvous
spot to the schoolhouse. Dutch Prince Bernhard was present in the
Allied convoy as leader of the NBS and he caught the attention of
many Dutch citizens cheering from their windows as he passed.76
Representatives of various Dutch civil departments responsible for
overseeing eventual food distribution during and following Faust also
attended in the German convoy.77 Two entrances to the school were
used: one for the Allies, and one for the Germans. An FCA account
described the extraordinary circumstances as follows:
For the first time during the whole war the leaders of the opposition were
conducted into our midst, not as prisoners of war (and this situation
cannot be far off), but as leaders in their various spheres of service,

“Memo summarizing arrangements for meeting with representatives of the German
authorities in Holland,” Appendix C, 5.
73  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 18-19, DHH.
74  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 18-19, DHH.
75  
De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 153.
76  
De Guingand, “Operation Victory,” January 1947, Vroemen 447, File 95, 3, NIMH
77  
See, AHQ Historical Section reports no. 17, 20 and 56, DHH.
72  
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30 April: German negotiators arriving and entering schoolhouse, where they and
representatives of the Allies parlied about supplying food to the Dutch people still in Germanheld areas. [Library and Archives Canada PA-154126]

sections and formations of the German forces still grimly holding on
to the third of Holland still remaining to them… Holland’s Public
Enemy #1 – Seyss-Inquart had come for the sole purpose of doing all
in his power to rid himself of one of the most pressing embarrassments
[famine]… He had come to obtain the maximum assistance from the
Allies, which would ensure that at least one of his problems, and by now
he has many, would be solved.78

The meeting began with the Allies laying out the details of each
delivery method in a “cold, matter-of-fact language.” At 1630h the
conference split into subcommittees to negotiate the specifics of each

“Notes taken by the Chief of Staff First Canadian Army at the second meeting of
Allied representatives with German representatives in regard to the feeding of the
Dutch in Western Holland,” 4 May 1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix
C, 1-2, LAC.
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operation. From this point, discussion regarding Operation Faust
was left to I Corps.79
Simultaneous to Faust’s subcommittee meeting was a nowfamously dramatic interaction between a cornered Seyss-Inquart and
Eisenhower’s deputy, Gen. Smith, who kept some other senior officials
and the head of SHAEF intelligence in the room with him. Smith began
by pouring the Reichskommissar a stiff glass of gin, while warning
that Eisenhower held every intention of holding German commanders
responsible for “any disaster that might befall [the Dutch].” SeyssInquart admitted to the imminence of Germany’s defeat, at which
point Smith suggested that he surrender the western Netherlands.
Appearing reluctant, Seyss-Inquart deflected on the grounds that
only Blaskowitz had the authority to make such a military decision.
Seeing through this rejection of responsibility, Smith replied, “but
surely, it is the politician who dictates the policy to the soldier, and
in any case our information points to the fact that no real supreme
headquarters exists any longer in Germany today.” But Seyss-Inquart
resisted, stating that he feared what “future generations” of Germans
would say about him, also adding, “what would history say about
my conduct?” Smith then lost his temper. De Guingand recalls him
stating, “if through pigheadedness, you cause more loss of life to
Allied troops or Dutch civilians, you will have to pay the penalty.
And you know what that will mean - the wall and a firing squad.”80
Other accounts famously recall a statement along the lines of, “well,
in any case, you are going to be shot.” When the Reichskommissar
replied “that leaves me cold,” Smith snapped “it will!”81
After discussing the abysmal condition of the Dutch populace,
the conversation turned to general news. A German captain who
had been staffed with Seyss-Inquart since the beginning of the
occupation was particularly talkative. The captain’s teleprinter
with Berlin had apparently failed to inform him that his hometown
of Munich had been captured by the Allies and that Berlin was
surrounded by the Russians. The room fell silent for several

“Notes taken by the Chief of Staff First Canadian Army,” 4 May 1945, RG24,
Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 1-2, LAC.
80  
De Guingand, “Operation Victory,” January 1947, Vroemen 447, File 95, 4, NIMH
81  
“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 2, LAC. See also Zuehlke, On
to Victory, 409-20.
79  
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minutes. 82 Seyss-Inquart had seemingly kept his staff in the dark
as to Germany’s imminent defeat.
Meanwhile, Foulkes met with German General Plocher to discuss
relief through the Grebbe Line. Plocher suggested that only the road
through Rhenen be put under ceasefire. While he agreed with the
pathing of the operation, Foulkes insisted such a narrow gap was
impracticable, increasing the risk of conflict, not to mention the danger
of the Canadians being easily cut off from their own lines.83 The
Germans also suggested setting definitive times for a ceasefire during
each day as Plocher was anxious that his superiors not interpret a
general ceasefire as a failure to follow orders. Foulkes insisted on
a comprehensive ceasefire, stating that “you can’t fight from two
to four and then go on after tea.”84 Any confused or insubordinate
German could easily botch the whole operation by firing off a single
bullet, which Foulkes sought to mitigate with a large and clearly
defined boundary.85
Foulkes viewed Plocher as rather incompetent and shy. The FCA
account chalked his reluctance up to German honour, which shunned
“any mention of a general truce or a suspicion of a general surrender.”
Whatever Plocher’s own views, it remained “a question [where]
higher authority had to be consulted.”86 Blaskowitz’s nervousness in
neutralising the western Netherlands without authorisation would
hold greater weight amongst his subordinates than would the bidding
of Seyss-Inquart, a bureaucrat who was concealing much of the true
situation. Blaskowitz called Seyss-Inquart on the night of 30 April,
stating that he “was very apprehensive” due to pressure from his
superiors in Berlin looking for information regarding the situation.87
Regardless of the pressure from Berlin, Blaskowitz personally had
expressed hope to Seyss-Inquart since early April that, “if a way
could be found to avoid [the scorched earth order], he would be ready
to do so.”88
“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 3-4, LAC.
83  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 21, DHH.
84  
“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 2, LAC.
85  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 21, DHH
86  
“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 4, LAC.
87  
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, 11 June 1946, 16.
88  
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, 14 June 1946, 214.
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Frustrated with Plocher, Foulkes requested a meeting with
Blaskowitz to make ceasefire plans with someone holding sufficient
authority to do so. They agreed that Blaskowitz’s Chief of Staff,
General Paul Reichelt, would attend the following day. This did not
delay Operation Faust as there was about a day’s worth of remaining
work on both sides to fix necessary roads and bridges.89
The general conference reconvened at 1730h to finalise the relief
provisions. The Canadians noted that many of the German officers
appeared competent regarding the respective relief methods assigned
to them. Plocher was the exception, appearing unable to “put his
foot firmly on the ground,” and continuously sent his “stooge”
running off to check matters with Seyss-Inquart. The FCA account
described other German officials as having “no shame, no question
of subservience or currying of favour.”90 The discussion between
Foulkes and Plocher held the most weight since the Germans would
be flagrantly disregarding Berlin’s directives and that the Canadians
would be assuming most of the risks for the Allies given the necessity
for elements of I Corps to operate behind enemy lines.
At 1845h the two delegations parted ways. As the Allied
participants left the schoolhouse they were greeted by Prince
Bernhard, seated in Seyss-Inquart’s Mercedes, which had been stolen
and presented to him by a sixteen-year-old boy in the resistance.
It was parked “in the most conspicuous place possible” among
the enormous celebratory crowds that had gathered to witness the
extraordinary events. A Dutch pennant flew on its radiator.91 SeyssInquart exited the schoolhouse ten minutes after the Allied delegates.
The FCA account noted he was “obviously ill at ease, since one sensed
the hatred of the Dutch people for him as they muttered beneath
their breath at his departure.” An issue arising from typographical
errors in the meeting documentation delayed his exit. Thankfully,
“the crowd got full value as a result of the delay.”92

“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 2, LAC.
90  
“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 4, LAC.
91  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 23, DHH.
92  
“Second meeting of Allied representatives with German representatives,” 4 May
1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, Appendix C, 5, LAC. For more elaborate
accounts of the negotiations at Achterveld see Zuehlke, On to Victory, 409-420; and
de Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 150-152.
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Foulkes followed up on 1 May with Blaskowitz’s Chief of Staff,
General Reichelt, to confirm a ceasefire between the Arnhem to
Utrecht railway and where the Waal River met the town of Ochten.
Foulkes insisted that in order for the urban centres to receive a secure
line of transport, the area north of the railway also needed to be
demilitarised. Critically, Reichelt needed two days to confirm this
with Blaskowitz, during which a “gentleman’s agreement” ensured
that if any altercations occurred during the operation, the fault would
lie with the Germans.93 Ongoing meetings with the German command
helped ensure compliance, further solidifying the temporary ceasefire
into a permanent one. Meanwhile, on 1 May the Dutch Ministry of
Food inside the western Netherlands reported that there would be
no more distribution of food. There simply was not any supply left.94

security and distribution
I Corps was left with roughly 36 hours to assemble manpower and
resources for an unprecedented, and therefore largely improvised,
operation behind enemy lines. Thankfully, the advanced stockpiles
and clear transportation routes afforded by the effective ceasefire
allowed Faust’s logistic situation to stabilise well before an official
German surrender.
Immediately following the negotiations on 30 April, Foulkes
summoned Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt.-Col.) E. A. DeGeer and Major
T. W. Bigelow of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC)
to Supply and Transport HQ, I Corps. DeGeer was appointed
commander of RCASC Faust, with Bigelow second-in-command.95
At 2330h they passed on loose instructions for Operation Faust
to Lt.-Col. G. D. Ross-Smith of 1st Canadian Division, RCASC,
which emphasised the importance of discipline during the operation,
requesting formality in the conduct of personnel being “surveilled” by
German troops. A “smart turn-out in dress” was required, along with
strict instructions to act formally around enemy personnel to avoid

“Decisions made at a meeting between Lt-Gen C. Foulkes and Lt-Gen Reichelt,
CofS to Col-Gen Blaskowitz,” 1 May 1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, LAC.
94  
Maass, The Netherlands at War, 234.
95  
War Diary: HQ RCASC 1 Cdn C Tps, 30 April 1945, Vroemen 422, NIMH.
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fraternisation.96 Detailed instructions were contained in the “Faust
Maintenance Plan” which Ross-Smith circulated to the RCASC:
(a) Platoons will be self contained.
(b) Platoon command’s vehicle and first and last lorry of each platoon
convoy will display a white flag.
(c) Convoy control and discipline must be standard and of the highest
order. Platoons will move complete with officers and all NCOs.
(d) Weapons will be carried unobtrusively.
(e) Drivers will remain in or beside their vehicles at all times in enemy
territory.
(f) No officer or OR will speak to, approach, or make any gesture
towards either enemy personnel or civilians.
(g) All ranks will be well turned out and will behave quietly and with
dignity in enemy territory.
(h) an officer from HQ RCASC “Faust” will inspect each platoon before
it takes the road.97

Working until about 0230h 1 May, Ross-Smith assembled 9 RCASC
and RASC platoons under I Corps command.
Despite the short timeframe given to assemble the means for such
an unusual operation, Ross-Smith expressed considerable optimism:
The month ends with the formation getting their teeth into some
interesting work after a long period of monotonous routine tasks. It will
definitely be of great interest to the officers and men employed on Op
Faust to be travelling and working behind enemy lines right alongside of
German soldiers. It is, of course, a job of the most humane nature and
evidently extremely urgent to keep thousands of civs from starving. No
one are better fit to handle a task of this nature than the men of this
formation who have worked for so long for the good of the oppressed
peoples under German rule and occupation.98

War Diary: RCASC 1 Cdn Infantry Division, 30 April 1945, Volumes 68 and 69,
“Bevrijding Veluwe” Collection, Volume 1004, Ede Municipal Archive.
97  
“S&T Maintenance 1 Canadian Corps, Second Maintenance Plan Operation
Faust,” Vroemen 56, NIMH.
98  
War Diary: RCASC 1 Cdn Infantry Division, 30 April 1945 - 1 May 1945, Volume
68, 33. “Bevrijding Veluwe” Collection, Volume 1004, Ede Municipal Archive.
96  
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By the beginning of May, average intake of food within the western
Netherlands reached a low of 500 to 600 calories daily. Adult intake
specifically dropped below 500 calories, the lowest caloric value
for official rations during the occupation.99 Surviving from such a
low-calorie level for an extended period was unsustainable without
supplementing available rations with food procured from the black
market, a luxury which few could afford. Throughout the occupation
wealth in the form of savings, jewelry, gold and labour began to
travel eastward to agricultural centers via the black market.100 Thus,
Faust’s true value was found in the targeted nature of its distribution
with priorities established via forward medical examinations of the
most vulnerable areas. Canadian planning as early as February 1945
ensured involvement of medical feeding units, collaboration with the
British Red Cross and nutritional survey teams.101 An FCA meeting
on 6 April reported the availability of “some 300 teams (each of two
or three specially trained medical students) for ‘forced feeding’ duty
of partially starved persons (done by intravenous injections).”102
Adhering to the arrangements set during the 1 May meeting, I
Corps artillery concentration was restricted to the absolute minimum
required to repel an attack through the Rhenen-Wageningen road.
Authority to engage was strictly reserved for the commanding officers
of 49th Infantry Division or 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade.103
Foulkes then developed a more detailed critical path regarding the
Faust ceasefire in an operational instruction sheet distributed to the
General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1st Canadian Infantry Division,
49th Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade. The
initial boundary of the ceasefire set on 1 May was to be adjusted
on 6 May upon the conclusion of reconstruction—due to previous
defensive inundation on the Grebbe Line—of a more direct secondary
transportation relief route along the line Ede-Zeist, the latter a town

99  
Stein, Famine and Human Development, 50; and De Zwarte, The Hunger
Winter, 105.
100  
Klemann and Kudryashov, Occupied Economies, 385.
101  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 172,” 4, DHH.
102  
“Meeting in Chief of Staff’s Caravan 1800hrs 1st Cdn Army,” 26 April 1945,
RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, 3, LAC.
103  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 27, DHH; and Stacey, The Victory
Campaign, 608.
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immediately east of Utrecht. On 3 May, Foulkes scheduled another
meeting with Reichelt to again confirm Blaskowitz’s consent.104
Canadian formations holding forwards positions at the Grebbe
Line welcomed the tactical stability afforded by Foulkes’ sustained
ceasefire, threats to which were scarcely reported in the early days
of May. Still, anxiety regarding the uncharted territory of working
behind enemy lines remained. Situated southwest of Ede in May,
the Hallamshire Battalion (49th Infantry Division) recognised the
defensive advantage held by the 34th SS (Dutch) Volunteer Division
and the remnants of 346th Division on the Grebbeberg high ground
through which Faust would have to pass:
The position was the original Grebbe Line, constructed by the Germans
when they anticipated an attack on West Holland. The Ground was
low lying and wet, and the position consisted of vast defensive works
raised up above the ground. In front of them lay a vast glacis, formed
by the fens bordering the river Grebbe. Beyond the river lay a high
feature from which the enemy could dominate the whole position. No
movement was possible in daylight, and the position could have been
most uncomfortable. Fortunately the truce to permit the taking of food
into Holland was now being observed by the enemy, and there was no
interference from them.105

This Dutch 34th SS division, comprised of pro-Nazi fanatics with
little left to lose, was the most unpredictable enemy force along the
southern Grebbe Line. Throughout April, 49th Infantry Division
reported frequent instances of these SS men undertaking “looting
forays” before being captured by patrols.106
To mitigate the chance of fighting breaking out, Foulkes
tasked Reichelt to provide the necessary guards to prevent looting
by both civilians and German military personnel, emphasising
that the Dutch SS be restrained.107 Blaskowitz also had to send

“Operational Instructions: GOC 1 Canadian Corps to 1 Cdn Inf Div, 49 Inf Div,
1 Canadian Armd Bde,” 1 May 1945, appendix to War Diary: G.S. First Canadian
Army, May 1945, LAC.
105  
War Diary: Hallamshire Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment, 1 May 1945,
Vroemen 410, NIMH.
106  
49th Infantry Division: “Summary – April 1945,” Vroemen 433, NIMH.
107  
“Decisions made at a meeting between Lt-Gen C. Foulkes and Lt-Gen Reichelt,
CofS to Col-Gen Blaskowitz,” 1 May 1945, RG24, Negotiations, Vol. 10658, 1, LAC.
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a representative to daily meetings of the Joint Food Distribution
Committee to report possible looting risks or neglect of security
obligations among the regular ranks.108 A similar I Corps
responsibility was 49th Infantry Division’s active involvement
in keeping members of the NBS disarmed in order to limit
inclinations toward violent retribution in the neutral corridor.109
DeGeer was then able to set up an ad hoc forward headquarters
on the Wageningen-Rhenen road 100 yards past the Canadian
forward defence line and 300 yards from the Germans’.110
Operation Faust began at 0730h on 2 May. As planned, a white
flag was mounted on the first and last truck of each convoy, while
I Corps kept weapons concealed. A motorcyclist tailed each convoy
to monitor for vehicle malfunctions, in which case all vehicles would
halt to await a tow. If this could not be accomplished, the vehicle and
driver would be left with a spare white flag and the map reference
reported to the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers to
conduct vehicle recovery and repair.111 Once the pace of deliveries
stabilised, thirty trucks of food crossed the Grebbe Line about
every 30 minutes, loaded with supplies from the advance stockpile
that had been set up at Ede.112 Approximately 360 vehicles were
involved, with a set objective to clear about 1,200 tons daily. Though
this target was never met, Faust managed a daily average of 988
tons, excluding 7 May which was spent moving the drop point from
Rhenen to Utrecht. An additional 150 three-ton trucks were supplied
to the Dutch to enable sufficient transport from Rhenen to Utrecht
and further distribution points in major cities.113 This latter stage
of distribution was an entirely Dutch affair—a collaborative effort
between NMA and NBS—though I Corps became involved in other

108  
“Operational Instructions: GOC 1 Canadian Corps to 1 Cdn Inf Div, 49 Inf Div,
1 Canadian Armd Bde,” 1 May 1945, appendix to War Diary: G.S. First Canadian
Army, May 1945, LAC.
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aspects northward as the Germans surrendered and disarmed over
the following several days.114
Enough German military personnel adhered to security
protocol for the operation to work, though some minor threats
remained. For example, one notable incident was dealt with by
49th Infantry Division:
It was good to note that the enemy watched the proceedings with
evident awe, not having seen so many vehs and so much food for a long
while… One officer and two ordinary ranks of the German Long Range
Sabotage Cp were captured by 1 Leicesters. These and other men had
undergone a special course and were then intent upon reaching the back
areas of our lines where sabotage would be easy. They carried special
explosives.115

This inconsistency can be partially attributed to disparity in courage
to defy Berlin among German superiors. While Seyss-Inquart had
gone so far as to write Hitler’s successor Reich Chancellor Grand
Admiral Karl Dönitz on 2 May requesting formal permission to
fully cooperate with Allied negotiations, Blaskowitz wrote to
Wehrmacht High Command the same day claiming he had refused
the Allied ceasefire.116
Many on the Canadian side felt “deprived of the opportunity of
having a good look at the opposition from their side of the fence.”117
DeGeer ordered that upon embarking from the “lying up area,
Control Point, and Supply Point No Man’s Land” platoon command
would inspect every vehicle to ensure that there were no civilians or
unauthorised personnel (including British and Canadian) within.118
With war’s end obviously imminent, distracted troops might have
been less inclined to act accordingly with the severity of operating on
the other side of the Grebbe Line. When news came on 2 May that
German forces in Italy had surrendered, many Canadian formations

114  
“Conference on Revised System of Relief Supplies for B2 Are Held at HQ
Netherlands District on 4 May 1945,” 5 May 1945, RG24, Vol. 10834, 1, LAC.
115  
War Diary: HQ 59 (WR) Infantry Division, 2 May 1945, LAC.
116  
De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 151-152.
117  
War Diary: RCASC 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 2 May 1945, “Bevrijding
Veluwe” Collection, Volume 1004, Ede Municipal Archive.
118  
“Lt-Col E. DeGeer to Pl Comds: Convoy Control and Discipline,” 2 May 1945,
Volume 057, File 5045, NIMH.
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3 May: German soldiers guarding food dump established in forward area, talking to one
of the Dutch drivers who is to distribute the food in a Canadian truck. [Library and Archives

Canada PA-134416]

in the Netherlands dispensed rum ahead of celebrations.119 While just
840 of the estimated 1,200 tons of food were delivered on the first day
of Operation Faust, the operation came much closer to meeting these
targets in the following few days.120
On 3 May, a Faust platoon from 1st Infantry Brigade Company,
RCASC, drove past a group of German soldiers and high-ranking
officials, who were escorting Reichelt to a meeting with Foulkes
scheduled for 1100h to confirm those arrangements Foulkes had
proposed two days before.121 Reichelt agreed to formalise the existing
War Diary: 1st Canadian Division RCASC, 2 May 1945, LAC.
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 24-25, DHH.
121  
War Diary: RCASC 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3 May 1945, LAC.
119  
120  
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ceasefire. Arrangements were also made to lay a telephone line
connecting the forward defence lines of 49th Infantry Division and
the Germans via the Rhenen-Wageningen road in order to strengthen
communications during the surrender negotiations. Having sought
Blaskowitz’s authority, Reichelt agreed to extend the ceasefire
northward upon completion of the Ede-Zeist-Utrecht road on 6 May,
but remained reluctant to halt patrols and other defensive measures
in the region. Foulkes insisted that if there were any threats to the
ceasefire or negotiations on the German side, the Canadians would
“retaliate tenfold.”122 Foulkes had to further sweeten the deal with
a promise that Reichelt would not be handed over to the Soviets—a
rumored Allied practice feared by his men who “would rather die”
than be subjected to the horrors of captivity in Soviet hands.123
On 4 May, a Medical Advisory Committee led by Sir Jack
Drummond was granted passage through the Grebbe Line to survey
health conditions in Amsterdam, the Hague and Rotterdam. Dr. C.
Banning—Chief Medical Inspector of the Public Health Service of the
Netherlands since 1939—provided valuable assistance to the Medical
Advisory Committee.124 After the war Banning praised the “very
special work in the medical and social spheres” done by the feeding
and relief teams, which were “formed in the south of the country on
an Allied model.”125
The model praised by Banning was designed to compile sufficient
medical data enabling swift administration of targeted relief. Canadian
Civil Affairs units would utilise data provided by the Medical
Advisory Committee—along with secondary assessments conducted
after German capitulation by I Corps—to direct proportional relief to
areas most in need. Upon identifying the level of hunger and health of
a region, Dutch or Canadian convoys would leave from the Canadian
depot at Rhenen and deliver supplies to Civil Distribution Points
(CDPs) located at key locations: Haarlem, Alkmaar, Den Helder,

AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 27-28, DHH.
Memo by General Foulkes, 3 May 1945, quoted in AHQ Historical Section,
“Report No. 56,” 48-49, DHH.
124  
“Civil Affairs Report on the Provinces of Utrecht, North and South Holland on
the Entry of 1 Canadian Corps 7-8 May,” 8 May 1945, Vol. 13,609, RG24, C17, 1,
LAC.
125  
“Food Shortage and Public Health, First Half of 1945.” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 245 (1946): 97.
122  
123  
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Dordrecht, The Hague, Leiden, Gouda, Utrecht and Amersfoort.126
The Civil Affairs procedure for forward medical assessment teams
whose data informed operations was as follows:
One team will examine people in institutions and the other will perform
a representative survey from the poorest section of the town. The two
reports will be amalgamated at the end of each day and sent to their
usual destinations. From the information thus obtained the immediate
distribution of food can be performed with the realization of the varying
degrees of severity of malnutrition in the various centres of population.127

Consideration of socio-economic status was critical given how this
factor determined the severity of risk between cities, but also between
different neighborhoods within cities. The most pervasive example
of poverty-related food inaccessibility was in Rotterdam, which saw
300-500 cases of advanced starvation a day during the surveyed
period, with many more unreported. In response, ten medical feeding
teams were dispatched to Rotterdam starting 8 May, about twice as
many as usual.128
Before this stage could begin, the articles of surrender had
to be signed and put into action. On the evening of 4 May, the
Royal Canadian Army Signals Corps were given a “special line
job” through the road on which Faust was operating in order
to provide communications between the scene of the surrender
conference at Wageningen and the German command. This was
because Reichelt represented Blaskowitz in the preliminary stages
of the conference since its outcome remained uncertain. A barrier
had already been erected to prevent entry of all vehicles except
those involved in relief operations.129
Before Blaskowitz arrived to sign the surrender agreement,
Foulkes and Reichelt met at 1100h on 5 May to address technicalities
involved in opening the Ede-Utrecht road—particularly the instability
of the Dutch SS—before Blaskowitz arrived to sign the agreement.
126  
“Conference on Revised System of Relief Supplies for B2,” 1; AHQ Historical
Section, “Report No. 56,” 25, DHH.
127  
“Message from J.F. McCreary – Subject: Surveys,” 8 May 1945, RG24, Civil
Affairs vol. 10834, LAC.
128  
“Civil Affairs Report on the Provinces of Utrecht, North and South Holland,” 8
May 1945, Vol. 13,609, RG24, C17, 2, LAC.
129  
War Diary: Signals 1 Canadian Corps HQ, 4 May 1945, C-3, 14920, RG24, LAC.
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5 May: German and Canadian telephone link up with German Major K. Henninger, German
Signals, and Sgt. J. Steacy, 1 Canadian Corps Signals, in no-mans-land. [Library and Archives
Canada PA-133407]

After this brief meeting, “Press photographers had a field day when
the German Volkswagen on departure became hopelessly entangled
with a food convoy winding through the village.”130 Upon Blaskowitz’s
arrival in the afternoon, Foulkes made it clear that as he read out
the terms of surrender no discussion was allowed other than for
clarification. The Germans still needed time to disarm meaning that
the Canadians could not move into the remainder of the western
Netherlands to directly assist relief operations until 7 May.131
Foulkes continued to meet with Blaskowitz and Reichelt over the
following few days to ensure compliance and favourable conditions for
Operation Faust. Blaskowitz returned to Wageningen the next day
to go over the chain of command for the surrendered German forces
which were falling under control of I Corps. But when Blaskowitz
asked that his troops be allowed to retain some arms for “protection
War Diary: General Staff, HQ 1 Canadian Corps, post mortem no. 5, 16 May
1945, quoted in AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 29, DHH.
131  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” Appendix F, DHH.
130  
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5 May: More empty trucks returning through barriers with two German guards checking
returning vehicles. [Library and Archives Canada PA-134404]

against the Dutch,” Foulkes replied, “I will protect you just as
efficiently as I fought you.”132
The same day an FCA meeting was held which determined
that under no circumstances would Blaskowkitz’s headquarters
have communications with Netherlands District or any other relief
organisation. All civil affairs and military government matters
would be handled by I Corps.133 FCA also issued an order that
all enemy forces would be treated as “capitulated troops” rather
than war prisoners, a wise distinction aimed at leveraging German
administrative capacity.134 On 7 May a conference was held at I
Corps headquarters with Seyss-Inquart’s bureaucratic right hand,
Schwebel, to coordinate institutional cooperation between Canadian
Only German officers were permitted to carry concealed pistols. See AHQ
Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 31-32.
133  
“Minutes of Conference held by the Chief of Staff with Heads and Reps of
Branches and Services in Regard to the Conference with the Germans at HQ 1 Cdn
Corps Monday, 7 May 45,” 6 May 1945, appendix to War Diary: G.S. First Canadian
Army, May 1945, 2, LAC.
134  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 32, DHH.
132  
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Civil Affairs units, NMA and governmental systems that the
Germans had established during the occupation. Schwebel stubbornly
insisted that the German role was “purely advice and supervision
of the Dutch administration,” but agreed that upon Canadian
entry into the North, “German Civ Gov personnel would remain
at their post and be prepared to assist Canadian detachments with
all information that might be required.”135 When asked additional
supply related questions, Schwebel agreed to discuss the matter at
a larger conference at Wageningen the following day.
Faust halted operations briefly on 7 May as I Corps moved
northward to liberate Utrecht while the Wageningen conference
took place. RCASC platoons took the opportunity to clean vehicles
and equipment before the supply depot was moved from Rhenen to
Utrecht, which was expected to be completed the next day.136 Upon
Faust deliveries reaching designated CDPs, NMA—in conjunction
with regular bureaucratic bodies and under the supervision of Civil
Affairs I Corps—would direct the food to “wholesale houses, retail
shops... and kitchen centres.”137
The liberation of northern towns such as Utrecht and Amsterdam
further revealed a disconnect between the casual excitement within
regimental reporting and the actual severity of famine for those who
were unfit to attend things like street celebrations. A 1st Canadian
Infantry Brigade RCASC account described the scene as the formation
entered liberated Utrecht, demonstrating a flippancy toward the
severity of the famine in corners of the city unable to celebrate:
The haul was quite exciting. People were out on the roads waving and
cheering and whenever you stopped you were mobbed by men, women
and children wanting chocolate, cig’s or biscuits. If you had thought that
the Italians were big bums you ought to get with some of these Dutch
people… Note: they are really hungry. We saw some of the German
Service Corps with their horses and wagons and they didn’t look very
fed up either.138

“Notes on a Conference Held at Main HQ 1 Cdn Corps at 1100 Hrs 7 May 1945,”
appendix to War Diary: Civil Affairs Rear HQ 1 Canadian Corps, May, LAC.
136  
Notes on a Conference Held at Main HQ 1 Cdn Corps at 1100 Hrs 7 May 1945,”
appendix to War Diary: Civil Affairs Rear HQ 1 Canadian Corps, May, footnotes
and 14, LAC.
137  
CMHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 172,” 22, DHH.
138  
War Diary: RCASC 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 8 May 1945, LAC.
135  
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HQ I Corps RCASC also noted that “everyone wants to relax but
it is impossible due to the work to be done.” Visiting headquarters
the following day, DeGeer was happy to report that Faust was
going well, yet staff still saw the workload after liberation to be
greater than it had been before.139 I Corps Rear HQ similarly noted:
“work continued much as usual, everybody happy enough about
[the German surrender], but restrained by the knowledge of the
enormous difficulties ahead. There was the odd bottle finished; the
camp was strangely quiet.”140 Not only was the German security
threat important to mitigate, but also impatience and ignorance
among the Canadian ranks.
A rather disorganised conference was held between British and
Dutch representatives at Wageningen on 8 May to discuss relief
progress made by NMA, at which there was mistakenly no I Corps
representation. Netherlands District had to explain to 21st Army
Group representatives that “relief and rehabilitation of B2 area was
now the responsibility of I Corps: HQ Netherlands District was not
responsible until ordered to take over… sub areas and given the
necessary resources.”141 Statistics tabled regarding the transfer of the
Faust supply depot from Rhenen saw that 4,000 of the 7,000 tons
of rations that had crossed the Grebbe Line were in Utrecht being
prepared for transport to the northernmost cities.142 Regarding these
major urban centres, Civil Affairs stated that “a great many cases
never reach hospitals,” meaning the state of famine in the north was
likely to be worse than early medical reports let on.143 Every bit of
time saved during these massive hauls of food saved lives.
Another dark reality far removed from the celebratory atmosphere
of the German surrender was hunger rife within concentration camps
holding imprisoned members of the Dutch resistance. This included
the Amersfoort concentration camp which three years before acted as
a primary transit camp to deport Dutch Jews to the East and held
Dutch resistance members for the remainder of the occupation. The

War Diary: HQ RCASC 1 Canadian Corps, 8-9 May 1945, LAC.
War Diary: Civil Affairs Rear HQ 1 Cdn Corps, 7 May 1945, LAC.
141  
“Meeting at Wagningen 8 May 45,” appendix to War Diary: Civil Affairs Rear
HQ 1 Canadian Corps, May, LAC.
142  
“Meeting at Wagningen 8 May 45,” appendix to War Diary: Civil Affairs Rear
HQ 1 Canadian Corps, May, LAC.
143  
“Civil Affairs Report on the Provinces of Utrecht, North and South Holland,” 8
May 1945, Vol. 13,609, RG24, C17, 3, LAC
139  
140  
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need to treat malnourished Dutch prisoners was apparent in the First
Canadian Army Civil Affairs medical report, but the full extent of
evil associated with the camp was still being uncovered:
This was a purely Dutch camp. It will be noted that when the
Netherlands Red Cross took over on 19 April they found 300 people on
the edge of starvation. Investigations are continuing into the records of
the camp in the early days, but so far no evidence of org cruelty, other
than starvation, has come to hand. Reports of Gestapo murders and
brutality are being investigated.144

On 10 May, once CDPs were fully stocked and NMA was supplied
with sufficient trucks, the military aspect of Canadian relief efforts—
Operation Faust—was disbanded. The situation no longer warranted
heavy military supervision of relief transportation and enough
rations had reached the North to prevent any food-shortage shortage
emergencies. Faust’s tonnage deliveries totaled:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

May:
May:
May:
May:
May:
May:
May:
May:

840
905
1002
878
1141
0
1029
1118145

Throughout the remainder of May, RCASC units were mostly occupied
with existing transport obligations and evacuation of some civilian
medical patients and casualties. Rotterdam required particular
attention to treat famine-related illnesses.146 While the disarming of
German troops was largely winding down by 10 May, formations like
the British 49th Infantry Division still had plenty of work rounding
up German and Dutch SS deserters. I Corps remained responsible
144  
“Civil Affairs Report on the Provinces of Utrecht, North and South Holland,” 8
May 1945, Vol. 13,609, RG24, C17, 3, LAC
145  
The supply depot was moved from Rhenen to Utrecht on 7 May. See AHQ
Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 24-25, DHH.
146  
“Employment of RCASC Personnel 1 Cdn C Tps,” 14-20 May 1945, “Bevrijding
Veluwe” Collection, Volume 1004, Ede Municipal Archive.
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13 May: German soldiers handing in weapons at a 1st Canadian Infantry Division arms
dump, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 13 May 1945. [Library and Archives Canada PA-134425]

for general security and NBS and other resistance organisations
were not yet able to carry arms.147 49th Infantry Division was also
instructed to establish a security line after the German capitulation
running along the Grebbe from the Zuider Zee to the Neder Rijn, the
aim being to enable proper security measures for travel passes that
would only be issued to I Corps, Civil Affairs, NMA, NBS and Dutch
governmental representatives.148 This security line was disbanded on

147  
“CRA 49 (WR) Infantry Division to Bergemeesters and Provincial Commissioner
of Utrecht,” 11 May 1945, Vroemen 422-72, NIMH.
148  
49th Infantry Division: “A Security Line Zuider Zee to Neder Rijn,” WO
171/4236, XC/A 56495, TNA.
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1 June, giving the Dutch control over movement in their country for
the first time in five years.149
On 23 June, after having continued to provide manpower support
to relief efforts, the Canadians notified NMA that they were pulling
out of operations in the western Netherlands. Effective 1 July, the
full responsibility of transport and distribution would fall on Dutch
authorities.150 Netherlands District reported that by 30 June the
Allies had distributed a total of 126,058 tons of food to the Dutch.
The CDPs were also stocked with ten days’ or more of supplies.151 On
3 July, The Dutch Board of Commissaries for Commerce, Industry
and Agriculture wrote to First Canadian Army:
The difficulties during a period, immediately subsequent upon the
liberation, were inevitably many and great. Nevertheless we may say
at the end of this period, that we have seen a constant improvement of
the situation develop gradually. This has been due, in no small part,
to the troubles taken by you and the officers under your command.
We therefore wish to express, in taking leave of you, how much we feel
indebted to you.152

Praise aside, Operation Faust was not without flaws. The Army
Headquarters Reports compiled by the General Staff Historical
Section in the postwar period remain an excellent source from
which to gauge how Canadian assessments of the operation have
aged. Historical Report No. 56, which focused on the German
surrender, suggested two themes related to the logistical efficacy
and the humanitarian value of Faust. Dealing first with efficacy,
this report argued food did not reach major cities in the north until
10 May 1945 due to NMA inefficiencies and Dutch resistance being
incapacitated by members having gone into hiding or their weakened
physical condition:

War Diary: Civil Affairs Rear HQ 1 Cdn Corps, 29 May 1945, LAC.
“Relief Supply Programme – B1 and C Area,” 23 June 1945, RG24, Military
Government, Vol. 10570, LAC.
151  
“Final Summary Report on the Relief of Provinces of North & South Holland and
Utrecht by DDCA Netherlands District,” 1 July 1945, RG24, Military Government,
Vol. 10570, 3, LAC.
152  
“BI” and “C” Areas, & SHAEF Adm Plans & Corres. Re Relief in the Provinces
of Netherlands,” 3 July 1945, RG24, Military Government, Vol. 10570, LAC.
149  
150  
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Although it is true that the Germans caused some delay by frequently
changing the type of passes issued to Dutch drivers of vehicles engaged
in carrying supplies from Rhenen, there is no evidence to indicate that
they used intimidation to prevent distribution taking place. The real
reason for the time lag was a shortage of Dutch labour and transport.153

While working relationships between NMA, Dutch resistance
and Allied planners was problematic at times,154 development of
distribution infrastructure would have had to wait until 7 May had
it not been for the Faust negotiations in April that kickstarted the
necessary legwork. I Canadian Corps, like clockwork, was then able
to supplement NMA and Dutch resistance organisational capacity
as the remainder of the western Netherlands became accessible
following German disarmament. The Canadians were able to
immediately provide NBS with 200 additional military vehicles to
assist transporting the food farther into the country and Canadian
Civil Affairs officers could survey individual towns to ensure equal
distribution after the general surrender was signed.155 Dr. Banning
expressed a similar sentiment in 1946:
A few days later, on May 5, 1945, the Germans capitulated, and relief
organizations that had long been prepared, especially to aid the western
provinces, began without delay to bring large quantities of food and to
send medical relief columns to the starvation areas… It can also be seen
that the mortality per 1,000 inhabitants did not vary greatly as among
the large cities. The highest rate was reached in The Hague. This is
partly due to war violence, particularly air bombardments.156

The rough average of 1,000 tons crossing the Grebbe Line a day
hardly met the previously stated October 1944 SHAEF estimate
of 2026 tons required to administer just one pound of food a day
to each civilian inside the western Netherlands. This target could
only be met if supplemented by the less secure Manna-Chowhound
drops, which were estimated to reach about 1,550 tons daily but

AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 26, DHH.
See Borys, Civilians at the Sharp End, 148-55.
155  
AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 25, DHH.
156  
Banning, “Food Shortage and Public Health,” 97.
153  
154  
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only managed to reach 7,500 in total between 30 April and 7 May.157
Of course, the needs of the Dutch were inevitably going to be met
at some point after the ceasefire, but expediency was critical to
save lives.
In Report No. 56, the Historical Section also quoted a contemporary
report that the amount of hunger in the western Netherlands was
“not as bad as been expected.”158 This assessment followed a medical
report that First Canadian Army sent to 21st Army Group on 8 May
1945, which employed more revealing logic:
During the period prior to the entry of I Canadian Corps all planning
for relief measures was based on the assumption that acute starvation
conditions and all attendant evils existed among the population of [the
western Netherlands].159

Compared to simply assuming the worst, whatever First Canadian
Army discovered on the other side of the Grebbe would be better
than expected. Further, such contemporary reports appear to have
disregarded increased hunger among the poor and vulnerable, opting
instead to highlight more generalized assessments of favorable health
among the Dutch public within medical reports:
Suffering came more from lack of quantity of food than vitamin
deficiency. Hospitals were mostly without water, light, or ambulances
and consequently not able to function properly. The highest mortality
figures appear in the youngest age groups and among the old and
poverty stricken. As always, the urban populations suffered far more
than the population of rural district. Starvation conditions have not
resulted in any very marked increase and health is remarkably good in
view of the wide-spread malnutrition.160

AHQ Historical Section, “Report No. 56,” 24-5, DHH.
A footnote by the Historical Section notes that Seyss-Inquart’s Nuremberg
testimony admitted to an estimated 25,000 dead from starvation. See AHQ Historical
Section, “Report No. 56,” 25, DHH.
159  
“Civil Affairs Report on the Provinces of Utrecht, North and South Holland,” 8
May 1945, Vol. 13,609, RG24, C17, 2, LAC.
160  
“Civil Affairs Report on the Provinces of Utrecht, North and South Holland,” 8
May 1945, Vol. 13,609, RG24, C17, 2, LAC.
157  
158  
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Regardless of whether tonnage requirements were met—or whether
health conditions were downplayed in Canadian reporting—the
targeted nature of Operation Faust proved essential in helping to
close the gaps left by Manna-Chowhound. A SHAEF report on relief
efforts in the Netherlands reflected that the Manna-Chowhound
rations dropped at specified locations for retrieval by NMA were
“extremely slow in getting… distributed” and likely did not reach
the populations in need until 9 May, two days after Faust had begun
assessing the vulnerability of towns.161 While discerning the full effect
of rations from either operation on the lives of individual Dutch
people is hard to measure, it is clear that Faust filled medical and
security needs that would have otherwise been neglected.
Not only does Faust’s value have to be thought of in the context
of death and hunger levels as they were during the operation, but
also as they could have been had relief and surrender negotiations
fallen apart or been delayed further. The western Netherlands faced
an absolute breaking point in terms of available food by May. As Dr.
Banning wrote in 1946:
Malnutrition as a cause of death came to the fore in a sharply rising
line. By the end of April the food situation in the west of the country
was hopeless. The ration stocks available were sufficient for only a few
more days, without any prospect of new supplies. Tens of thousands
lived on the brink of complete physical and mental exhaustion, and a
serious catastrophe seemed inevitable.162

Civil Affairs quickly learned that Blaskowitz had planned to
surrender by 12 May, as he calculated that after 15 May acute
starvation conditions would set in.163 Given that relief did not reach
northern cities until eight days after Operation Faust supplies first
crossed the Grebbe Line on 2 May, Allied reliance on this German

161  
“SHAEF Historical Monograph on relief for Holland, vol 1,” June 1945, RG24,
SHAEF Mission, Vol. 10430, 42, LAC.
162  
Banning, “Food Shortage and Public Health,” 95.
163  
Civil Affairs 1 Cdn Corps Weekly Report: Week Ending 11 May 45,” 11 May
1945, RG24-C-3, Vol. 16633, File BR/16 MIL GOV, LAC.
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timeframe would have likely led to exponentially more deaths.164 In
Rotterdam—where poverty-related food inaccessibility was most
apparent prior to liberation—no less than 33,000 cases of hunger
oedema were reported the week after liberation, while the death toll
was still on an upward trend.165 Inequality of health from a class
perspective is also described succinctly in Banning’s report:
The percentage of cases of death from malnutrition rose alarmingly
both for the [working-class]. In the last week of March the mortality
from malnutrition for the [working-class] amounted to more than half
the total mortality; in the second week of April this percentage even
rose to 60.6.166

In Rotterdam, deaths per week rapidly increased by 30 per cent in
merely two weeks at the end of April. This upward trend was dropped
to a 4.25 per cent increase in the first two weeks of May, followed
by a 47 per cent decrease in the last two weeks of May.167 This quick
turnaround in the death toll is directly linked to the dates on which
Operation Faust’s supplies entered the western Netherlands and was
enabled by the efficient and targeted nature of Faust’s medicallyinformed “Civil Distribution Point” method.
The condition in a once occupied country cannot be gauged by the
demonstrations in the streets. The press and casual visitors can be
relied upon to misrepresent completely the problems with which Canada
is faced… So large is the problem in estimating the exact state of affairs

164  
The most updated death estimate for the Hunger Winter is provided by De
Zwarte, who posits that 20,000 of the 35,000 war-related excess deaths inside the
western Netherlands were famine-related. For further discussion see Nuremberg Trial
Proceedings, 11 June 1946, 15-16; Banning, “Food Shortage and Public Health,” 99;
and de Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 259-60.
165  
van der Zee, The Hunger Winter, 301.
166  
Banning, “Food Shortage and Public Health,” 107.
167  
Banning, “Food Shortage and Public Health,” 101.
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in these densely populated cities, that experts already differ violently…
[We] arrived none too soon168

conclusion
At Nuremburg in June 1946, Seyss-Inquart was indicted despite
his defence emphasising food relief efforts and claiming formal
detachment of his office from various war crimes, not the least of
which was his role in the Jewish deportations in 1942.169 SeyssInquart even appealed unsuccessfully to Dutch Queen Wilhelmina
for a Royal Pardon based on his “efforts to protect the Dutch from
disaster.”170 He was hanged on 16 October 1946.
The period of September 1944 to mid-April 1945 saw Allied
political and military priorities almost always override Dutch
humanitarian concerns. In such a dynamic, Canadian forces possessed
little authority in relief planning. However, as the strategic situation
in the Netherlands changed enough to encourage the Allies to action
in March-April 1945, I Canadian Corps was situated that it became
increasingly responsible for both relief planning and security in the
region through which relief would arrive. As the Allied negotiations
with Seyss-Inquart began, Ede was already housing a stockpile for
necessary rations. Upon the implementation of a ceasefire on the
Grebbe Line, an advance stockpile was quickly established at Rhenen.
After the Germans surrendered on 5 May and disarmed on 7 May,
the advance stockpile was moved to Utrecht to then be directed
to vulnerable populations by I Corps Civil Affairs. Certainly, any
operation of this scope could not happen instantaneously, but given
the lives at risk, timeliness had to be a priority. Every day of relief
work saved by the ceasefire was important.

168  
This 11 May 1945 Civil Affairs report excerpt succinctly captures multiple
dilemmas at lay when we try to understand what Canada faced on the other side of
the Grebbe Line: the romanticised images of liberation; the disconnect between what
military and civil affairs personnel witnessed; and the differing starvation estimates
lost in the shadow of excitement at war’s end. “Civil Affairs 1 Cdn Corps Weekly
Report: Week Ending 11 May 45,” 11 May 1945, RG24-C-3, Vol. 16633, File BR/16
MIL GOV, LAC.
169  
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, 11 June 1946, 15-17.
170  
De Zwarte, The Hunger Winter, 125-26.
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Crossing the Grebbe Line

The Faust negotiations were an exhilarating and unprecedented
episode of the final tense days of the war in the Netherlands and
without doubt saved thousands of Dutch lives. This work has
showcased Canada’s vital role in an unheralded chapter of the
liberation of the Netherlands. Given the pride that Canadians and
the Dutch take in the shared experience of liberation, perhaps more
focus should be paid to specific humanitarian operations such as the
well-planned and efficiently executed Operation Faust.
◆

◆

◆

◆
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